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Abstract 
 
It is now widely agreed that an important driver of the European economic crisis has been the 
faulty original design of the Monetary Union, and that substantial steps are urgently needed 
towards the creation of truly European fiscal institutions. The notorious stumbling block 
along this path is political will. By cross-referencing the results of the 2014 elections of the 
European Parliament with Eurobarometer opinion polls and an indicator of economic pain, 
we argue that Europe experiences an unresolved tension between "more Europe" and "less 
Europe" at the level of European peoples. Data analysis at the country level reveals a surge of 
what we call Europe's Great Divide, a geo-economic-political cleavage across the EU and 
across the EZ as well. This is more complex, and perhaps worse, than the simplistic divide 
between "North" and "South" or "Core" and "Periphery", and it seriously undermines support 
for ‘more Europe’ "from below". 
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Europe's Great Divide. A geo-economic-
political map 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Europeans are largely aware that Europe is going through its most troubled 
times since World War II. Seven years after the outbreak of the Great 
Recession in the Western world, and the initial illusion of "being different", 
there is widespread consciousness that the European Union (EU) as a whole, 
and the Euro Zone (EZ) more acutely, have suffered comparatively worse 
economic conditions and are recovering at slower pace. Deep social and 
political repercussions have resulted, that are shaking the entire edifice with 
unprecedented intensity. 
 
Several indicators warn that an increasing number of European citizens are 
highly disappointed by Europe. Contributing to this disappointment are on 
an equal basis the weak democratic underpinnings of the EU decision process 
and the inability to fight the economic crisis and the spectre of stagnation. In 
the 2014 electoral campaign for the EU parliament the idea itself of European 
membership was challenged by openly anti-European parties and 
movements. True, their success in the polls was poorer than predicted by the 
media, and the traditional pro-European political families still hold the large 
majority in the parliament. Yet the very fact that the success of anti-European 
forces was expectable is indicative of the critical situation in which elections 
took place. Moreover, these forces are gaining ground in their home countries. 
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On inspecting the results more closely, we shall see that the prospects are 
indeed highly critical for the EU, and will remain so. 
 
Our research motivation is in particular the prospective evolution (or 
involution) of the EZ on the way towards "Completing Europe's Economic 
and Monetary Union" (Juncker 2015); on the premise, however, that this will 
be conditioned by, and will be of key importance for, the evolution (or 
involution) of the EU as a whole. Indeed, the distinction between countries 
within and outside the EZ becomes increasingly important. The EZ citizens 
share the same key political institution with the other EU citizens, but they 
have an experience of EU integration which is significantly different (Bertsou 
2014, Hobolt and Wratil 2015). As a matter of fact, the EZ has been the 
epicentre of the economic crisis and of its continental propagation (Croci 
Angelini, et al. 2015, Tamborini 2015), and at the same time it represents the 
most advanced frontier of sovereignty devolution in the EU. 
 
As far as the political and institutional challenges raised by the economic 
crisis are concerned, in section 2 we outline two main views. The first, which 
has been put forward and enforced by the European Commission and the 
leader countries, derives from the "national responsibility" doctrine on which 
the Maastricht Treaty rests with regard to all economic policy matters, except 
monetary policy. According to this view, if on the one hand governments are 
subject to a set of constraints on their budget policy, on the other the 
economic performance of their countries eventually depends on their policy 
choices within those constraints, so that compliance with the fiscal rules per se 
can by no means be deemed responsible for poor economic results. The 
European Commission's policy recommendations pave a failsafe way to 
marry fiscal rigour with growth. Put simply, the European economic crisis is 
the result of a collection of failures by governments ‘to do their homework’. 
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Over time, a second view, mainly supported by independent economic and 
political scholars, has gained ground. According to this view, the blame for 
the crisis should also, if not mostly, be borne by serious faults in the 
institutional design of the Monetary Union. The most critical fault is 
epitomized by the asymmetry between a supranational monetary institution 
responsible for the single monetary policy and many independent national 
fiscal authorities constrained by a set of fixed rules. This has resulted in a 
blatant macroeconomic mismanagement of the crisis, a self-defeating 
"country-by-country" approach lacking clear identification and pursuit of 
Europe’s collective goals. In order to fix this fault, it is argued that "more 
Europe" is needed, which means substantial strides towards further political 
integration starting from the fiscal sphere. This second view has eventually 
been subscribed to by the top EU institutions, as testified by the so-called 
"Four Presidents Report" drawing the road "Towards a Genuine Economic 
and Monetary Union" (European Council 2012), followed by a new report 
under the authorship of the Commission (Juncker 2015), and by speeches of 
the President of the European Central Bank (e.g. Draghi 2014a, 2014b, 2015).  
 
However compelling economic analyses may be, the notorious stumbling 
block on the way to this grand (re)design is political will. A well-established 
narrative explains the oddities in the Maastricht Treaty as a compromise 
between the so-called "French view" of the Monetary Union as a booster of 
political integration, and the "German view" that would instead reverse the 
order of factors. As a matter of fact, almost all national governments of 
different political colours have repeatedly proved unwilling to devolve more 
sovereign powers. Even under the pressure of the crisis, partial and painful 
progress has only been made in the field of common banking regulation, 
disappointing the hope for "progress through crises" that Jean Monnet viewed 
as a way for unification to grow (Monnet 1976).   
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There is a tendency to blame the appetite for power of politicians. However, 
the political science literature highlights a two-way causality nexus whereby 
the political parties influence national public opinions, and vice versa (Bølstad 
2015).  In democratic regimes politicians are, quite legitimately, sensitive to 
the public opinion, which gives the public opinion a leverage to steer political 
choices. We therefore address the problem of the political will for "more 
Europe" in the field of economic policy "from below" by looking at recent 
evidence on the European citizens' attitudes provided by the 2014 general 
elections for the EU Parliament and some concomitant Eurobarometer 
opinion polls.  
 
In section 3, we first substantiate the view of a political stalemate in the choice 
of "more" versus "less Europe". We represent this impasse as a trilemma posed 
by the constitutive dimensions of Europe: "European integration", "National 
sovereignty", "Democratic control". A critical tension has been growing over 
the past decade, at the social and political levels, between the pursuit of 
European integration and concerns for National sovereignty and Democratic 
control. Considering the positioning of the major European political groups in 
this trilemma, we argue that the elections have not resolved the tension 
between "more" or "less Europe". 
 
To show this, in section 4 we examine citizens’ sentiments towards Europe as 
reported by the first Regular Eurobarometer survey after the elections 
(Autumn 2014). Moreover, we consider the release of the Special 
Eurobarometer of July 2014 more specifically aimed at detecting judgements 
regarding home countries vis-à-vis the EU. This is in fact particularly 
informative on the issues at stake, because the attitude towards more EU 
integration has to be framed in comparison with the alternative represented 
by the home country. On this account, differences do emerge between 
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residents in the EZ and the others (No-EZ).1 The former are to a large extent 
negative towards both the EU and their own country, whereas the latter are 
negative towards their own country but positive towards the EU. A third area 
is positive towards both the EU and the home country, but this consists of a 
minority of EZ residents. A fourth, tiny area is negative towards the EU but 
positive towards the home country. It seems that the euro is a liability for 
sentiments towards the EU  though not necessarily towards the euro per se, 
as we shall see. On the other hand, this evidence of a fourfold distribution of 
countries according to the attitude of citizens along the EU/H dimension 
warns that i) the tension between "more" or "less Europe" is not an absolute 
one but is conditional upon the alternative of "more" or "less my own 
country"; ii) ignoring the EU/H and EZ/No-EZ dimensions and the related 
country mapping may yield misleading assessments of the support for further 
integration. 
 
Since economic conditions are regarded as a major driver of citizens’ opinions 
and votes (though perhaps less than expected: see Ward 2015), the European 
crisis has quite naturally spurred research on possible changes in the attitude 
towards the EU in general or towards specific issues such as the common 
currency or transfers of competences to the EU (recent examples are Guiso et 
al. 2014, Kuhn and Stöckel 2014, Hobolt and Wratil 2015). In this paper, we do 
not present yet another statistical test of the relationship between the crisis 
and Eurobarometer opinions. In fact, for the two reasons stated above, our 
main focus is not on the economic determinants of opinions per se, but on the 
extent to which the map of (the intensity of the) crisis adds further 
characterization to our four quadrants.2 To this end, for each country we 
present a simple index of economic pain over the five years from the outbreak                                                         1 Country locations between EZ and No-EZ refer to 2014, i.e. Lithuania is not included into the EZ. 2 We do not claim that characterization is causation. 
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of the crisis to the last year prior to the Eurobarometer survey (2009-13). It 
consists of the loss of GDP growth, the loss of real per capita income, the 
increase in unemployment, and the dosage of austerity. The association of the 
economic dimension with our fourfold distribution of countries is quite 
nuanced and far from being straightforward. The bottom line is that the area 
of global discontent is also characterized by high economic pain, though 
economic pain is not systematically associated with global discontent. One 
might think that people in this area split the blame for the crisis between the 
EU and their own governments, and that they are ready to endorse major 
economic-political changes, but probably not in the way enforced by the EZ 
authorities and rules. Our geo-economic map suggests political implications 
that add qualifications to other studies that will be discussed in section 4.   
 
Then in section 5 we cross these sentiments with the actual electoral results, 
and an even more problematic geo-economic-political map emerges. The 
above-described four areas of divergent European sentiments have also 
expressed consistently different electoral results. Apparent behind Europe's 
political stalemate is Europe's Great Divide between countries favouring the 
status quo (though possibly for different reasons) and others calling for a 
change (albeit in a disorderly manner). The former tend to prefer centre-right 
political parties; in the latter centre-left or Euro-critical parties tend to prevail. 
The emerging picture is more complex and tangled than the more usual one 
based on "North" and "South" or "Core" and "Periphery". 
 
Our main conclusion, which we set out in section 6, is that this geo-economic-
political map, though not entirely surprising, is worrisome. A perverse loop 
has been created between the economic crisis and its crippling political 
implications. Far from prompting support for further integration, the legacy 
of the crisis, and of its misleading "country-by-country"’ management in the 
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EZ, seems to push towards dis-integration of the European political space in 
tandem with the economic one. In other words, there is a tendency to 
‘nationalize’ the conflicting policy options concerning causes and remedies of 
the crisis, and the reform of the European institutions. The different options 
are no longer perceived trans-nationally along the left/right political spectrum, 
but rather through the lenses of national identity and interest. In Strasbourg 
national flags become more and more important than political ones. Europe's 
political stalemate on the way to progressive integration is now rooted in the 
citizens’ will, and its resolution can hardly be expected to come ‘from below". 
 
 
2. National responsibility vs. institutional design   
With regard to the prospective evolution (or involution) of the EU, a special 
role should be attributed to the EZ. As of 2015, 19 out of the 28 EU members 
and 65% of their total population belong to the EZ. The latter includes the 
largest and most advanced continental economies, and it is on the frontier of 
sovereignty devolution in the EU. In various respects, the EZ was the 
epicentre of the worldwide Great Recession of 2008-09 in Europe, and in the 
medium run its performance has been worse than that of both the United 
States, where the crisis originated, and the No-EZ countries (Tamborini 2015). 
The economic performance of the EZ, and the policy decisions of its 
institutions and member states inevitably affect all the other members. The EZ 
citizens have an experience of EU integration different from that of the others, 
but quite naturally, the attitude of citizens towards the EU is largely 
conditioned by the EZ. 
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Reactions to and reflections on the mounting threats of a general failure of the 
Monetary Union initially followed two different approaches. One, endorsed 
by the EZ policy institutions and some governments led by Germany, 
remained faithful to the doctrine of exclusive national responsibility in all 
economic matters, except monetary policy, on which the Treaties rest.3 In this 
view, in a context where monetary policy is committed to maintaining price 
stability, each member country is required to comply with the fiscal rules 
established by the Treaties, and with the policy recommendations put 
forward by the Commission. The performance of each country, whether good 
or bad, is mostly seen as the result of its own responsibility. In the end, there 
is no such a thing as the EZ, which is just the statistical average of what the 
single countries are doing. If the EZ as a whole has performed poorly, it is 
only because too large a number of members have been unable to manage 
their economies successfully and to follow rules and prescriptions faithfully. 
Consequently, the need for reforms is mostly placed at the level of single 
countries, whereas the general institutional setup is kept out of discussion. 
 
In the other approach, more largely adopted by economics and politics 
scholars worldwide, the "misbehaviour" of some members is only part of the 
story – probably the minor part. The institutional design of the EZ is instead 
at centre stage. Indeed, it has been matter of lively debate ever since its 
conception. Criticisms have been revived, and to a large extent vindicated, by 
the crisis.4 The fundamental fact is that the EZ is by no means a simple 
collection of separate economies, plus a single market built up through the 
acquis communautaire and a common currency. Quite the contrary: economic, 
financial and monetary integration generates reciprocal externalities which                                                         3 See e.g. the yearly "Report on Public Finances" by the European Commission, European 
Economy series. For an instance of particularly outspoken support for this view see e.g. Sinn (2014). More balanced argumentation can be found in some Commission papers such as Buti and Carnot (2013), Kuenzel and Ruscher (2013).  4 More recent noteworthy studies are De Grauwe (2013), Wyplosz (2013). 
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heavily condition the macroeconomic performance of each member. Likewise, 
incentives, or disincentives to national reforms, their choice and success 
cannot be conceived as being independent of the common institutions.  As a 
consequence, the national responsibility doctrine rests on shaky foundations 
as both a normative principle and a guide for policy.  
 
The first weakness is the asymmetry between devolution of monetary 
sovereignty to a single central bank and retention of fiscal sovereignty at the 
national level. This asymmetry had (and still has) strong political roots in the 
unwillingness to surrender fiscal sovereignty; it also received some academic 
support from advocates of the so-called "monetary dominance" as a shield for 
the central bank's independence against "fiscal dominance".5 However, critics 
point out that the ability of the EZ as a whole to deliver macroeconomic 
stability and "cohesion" is seriously impaired. A second, related criticism is 
that the set of fixed fiscal rules envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact was badly conceived and, more importantly, 
cannot be taken as a substitute for true fiscal policy coordination. The key 
point, mentioned above, is that the fiscal rules ignore cross-country 
externalities, whereas the thrust of policy coordination among countries 
belonging to a common currency area is the internalization of externalities in 
pursuit of the common good. This misconception of the fiscal rules is seen as 
the crucial factor in the substantial failure of the so-called "austerity" policies 
imposed on the EZ countries, according to a "country-by-country" approach 
lacking a clear identification and pursuit of Europe’s collective goals. A third 
poisoned fruit of the national responsibility doctrine, justified with ubiquitous 
"moral hazard" problems, is the lack of truly supranational governance and 
risk-sharing mechanisms in the financial sector. This was indeed where all 
                                                        5 Examples are Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Dixit (2001), Dixit and Lambertini (2001). 
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began: the contagion from the US to the EZ banking systems, the contagion 
within the EZ, the contagion from private to public financial distress. 
 
While the line of thought and policy faithful to the national responsibility 
doctrine is still alive, the idea that the core of the EZ problems lies in its 
institutional original sin has gained ground and has eventually been endorsed 
by the highest representatives of the EU institutions (European Council 2012, 
Juncker 2015, Draghi 2014a, 2014b, 2015). These ambitious documents 
essentially take stock of all the critical points recalled above. The challenging 
message is that the EZ, and the EU as a whole, must make a leap forward in 
the political integration process as a means to foster better economic policy. 
This message is not entirely novel, however. The designers of the Monetary 
Union, and the political leaders who signed the Maastricht Treaty, were well 
aware that a monetary union without a fiscal and political union is impaired 
and cannot go far. The bet was that progress in the economic and monetary 
dimension, albeit imperfect, would prompt progress in the others too, either 
on the wings of success or under the pressure of resolving crises (Padoa 
Schioppa 2004; Spolaore 2013). So far, the bet has not been won. Will it be in 
the foreseeable future? To address this question we should delve into its 
political dimension. 
 
 
3. Europe’s stalemate 
 
Throughout the post-war march towards "ever increasing European 
integration", an economic stumbling block was, in the famous words of 
Tomaso Padoa Schioppa, the "Impossible Quartet" consisting of free trade, 
free capital movements, monetary policy autonomy, and fixed exchange rates 
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(Padoa Schioppa 1988).  With the creation of the Monetary Union, the decision 
was taken to give up monetary sovereignty and keep the other "public 
goods". This has created a special relationship among the EZ countries and 
with the EU institutions. Nonetheless, the EZ citizens share the same key EU 
institutions, e.g. the Parliament and the Commission, with all the other 
citizens. Today, the EZ countries find themselves in an institutional trilemma 
that involves the EU as a whole, though perhaps with peculiar intensity. 
 
At the vertexes of a triangle (see Figure 1) we can place the constitutive 
dimensions of Europe: "European integration", "National sovereignty", and 
"Democratic control". "European integration", as it has developed over the past 
decades, is increasingly perceived as conflicting with the autonomy of 
governments in deciding on matters of national interest (the vertex "National 
sovereignty"), and with national institutions which are direct expression of 
people's will (the vertex "Democratic control").  The EZ fiscal rules, largely 
blamed for the negative consequences of austerity, are emblematic, but 
complaint about the EU generation of bureaucratic rules on almost all other 
matters is high outside the EZ as well. 
Figure 1. Europe's stalemate 
 
Centre-Right/ 
Right 
Democratic control 
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In an effort to organize ideas into a stylized picture, at the cost of some 
simplification, along the sides of the triangle we can also map three main 
political aggregations, Centre-Right/Right (CR/R), Centre-Left/Left (CL/L) and 
No Euro (NE, meaning both "no euro" or, more radically, "no Europe"), 
according to their traditional preferences and concerns. Thus, in the pursuit of 
European integration, the CR/R is particularly concerned with losses of 
National sovereignty, the CL/L with losses of direct Democratic control over 
the EU institutions, whilst the NE has a strong preference for preserving both 
National sovereignty and Democratic control at the expense of European 
integration. In the triangle, Europe’s stalemate corresponds to a point situated 
at an equal distance from the three vertexes.  
 
Table A1 in the Appendix reports the electoral results of these three 
aggregations in terms of seats won in the European Parliament (EP) in the 
general elections of March 2014 on the basis of official statements and 
agreements for parliamentary groups. As we shall see hereafter, the stalemate 
arises for two main reasons. One is that no political aggregation seems to have 
gained enough power to lead the entire EP, let alone the whole of political 
Europe. The other, perhaps more important, reason is that each political force 
in itself seems unable to devise a consistent road map, being instead 
paralyzed by internal disputes on the direction to head to. In fact, the true 
political scenario is even more crippled than appears in our triangle. 
 
To begin with, the political area pointing more to the base than to the tip of 
the triangle is larger than our NE. Some parties outside the official 
agreements (classified as Others) are definitely anti-euro and anti-Europe (e.g. 
the Northern League in Italy and the Front National in France). NE + Others 
reach 13.3% of seats. Moreover, the respective right and left wing of the CR/R 
and CL/L aggregations are similarly opposed to the European limitations on 
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popular sovereignty and national interests, and they are exposed to the NE’s 
political pressure on their constituencies. According to Treib (2014), the 
Eurosceptic parties can be credited with up to 30% of the European 
Parliament. The flip side of the coin is that they are heterogeneous in many 
other respects. Thus official parliamentary groups constituted by Eurosceptic 
parties weigh as little as 6% (see Table A1). In the end, they contribute to 
paralysis, since they are unable to form a political coalition favouring the 
dissolution of the EU integration process, while possessing sufficient power, 
in the EP and in society, to hamper any progress (Bertsou 2014).  
 
The CL/L parties not only have minority seats but they have also gathered 
heterogeneous discontent with and protest against the current state of affairs 
by promising to "change Europe". One ingredient of the recipe is a relaxation, 
if not renegotiation, of the EZ fiscal rules. Some leaders also press for an 
accelerated move towards a full-fledged democratic and federalist Union, 
pointing to the top-left side of the triangle, with acceleration on the 
"communitarian method". However, it is not clear how swiftly their electorate 
will follow. To give an example, the creation of a supranational fiscal 
authority has been at the top of the agenda of governance reforms for many 
years. How should this authority be appointed, with what legitimacy and 
powers, and with what enforcing instruments vis-à-vis single countries? The 
CR/R parties won the elections by offering protection to national interests and 
fears (especially in the North), rather than more Europe and cooperation 
(with the South). They thus tend towards the bottom-right side of the triangle. 
But it is not clear whether they will allow for more integration in small 
homeopathic doses filtered through the "intergovernmental method", or 
whether they will simply defend the status quo by vetoing any reform of the 
existing institutional architecture of the EU, and first and foremost of the EZ.  
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At present, therefore, few chances seem to exist to move towards the tip of the 
triangle from any side. As Guiso et al. (2014) aptly depict the situation of 
Europeans, "there is no desire to go backward, no interest in going forward, 
but they cannot stay still" (p. 6). The joint analysis of opinions, sentiments and 
votes expressed by EU citizens that we present in the next sections will 
substantiate our notion of Europe's stalemate, and in particular that the 2014 
elections have not resolved it, and may have even aggravated it, revealing 
what we call Europe's Great Divide along a geo-economic-political 
dimension. 
 
 
4. Europe, home countries and the crisis  
 
Our data source is Eurobarometer, the public opinion survey service 
conducted by Eurostat on behalf of the European Commission. It provides a 
great deal of information about citizens' opinions and sentiments on 
European matters which is largely employed in applied political economy 
research. 
 
We begin with an overview of the evolution of the general attitude towards 
Europe and the EZ as reported by the first available issue of the Standard 
Eurobarometer after the EP elections (n. 83, Autumn 2014). As shown by Figure 2, concerning the "image" of the EU, respondents with positive image 
declined markedly over the previous seven years: from 50% in 2006 to the all-
time low of 2013, when the positive and negative image scored almost the 
same 30% of respondents. 2014 was a year of recovery of respondents with a 
positive image, who rose to 39%, while those on the opposite front recoiled to 
22%. Another question concerning "trust" in political institutions (QA8a) 
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yields a similar declining trend for the EU, shared, however, with national 
parliaments and governments, and with no sign of recovery. As regards either 
optimism or pessimism for the future of the EU (QA22), optimists plunged 
from 69% in 2006 to 48% in 2011 and regained ground up to 56% in 2014. 
Overall, while 2014 showed some positive signs, the decline of pro-EU 
sentiments over the medium term remains substantial. 
 
Figure 2. QA9. In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly 
positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image? (% of EU) 
 Source: Standard Eurobarometer (No. 83, Autumn 2014). 
 
By contrast, Figure 3 shows that the barometer of attitudes towards the 
Monetary Union has remained fairly stable over time: between 60% and 70%, 
with only a slight decline of "for" respondents during the crisis, and the 
remarkably persistent feature that EZ residents are more "for", and less 
"against", than No-EZ ones. Against this background, we now examine more 
specific information regarding the issue discussed in this paper: the tension, at 
the level of public opinion, between the national and the supranational 
dimensions. 
 
Total positive 
Neutral 
Total negative 
Don't know 
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Figure 3. QA19.1. Please tell me whether you are for or against a European 
Economic and Monetary Union with one single currency, the euro (% of EU) 
 Source: Standard Eurobarometer (No. 83, Autumn 2014). 
 
 
4.1 A map of four quadrants  
 
Relevant information is provided by two questionnaires in the Special 
Eurobarometer No. 415, July 2014. The first (QA13) elicits the attitude towards 
a stronger Europe by means of two statements. The statement "We need a 
united Europe in today's world" collects 75% of agreement against 19% of 
disagreement. The statement "More decisions should be taken at the EU level" 
collects 45% of agreement and 46% of disagreement. This apparent 
inconsistency reveals a tension between the ideal of a united Europe, which 
seems to withstand the crisis headwind, and the willingness to take the 
necessary step of power devolution to this Europe here and now.6 
 
The second questionnaire (D73) provides further important information about 
this tension. Respondents were asked to answer a two-faceted question                                                         6 According to Guiso et al. (2014), not only the current EZ crisis, but also earlier major steps towards European integration in easier times have reduced pro-European sentiments. 
For (EZ) 
For 
Against (EZ) 
Against 
Don't know 
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eliciting a possible divergent opinion between how Europe as a whole, vis-à-
vis the respondent’s own country, is behaving: "At the present time, would you 
say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, 
in the European Union / in your country? "   
 
The questionnaire is designed so that there are four possible choices: EU-
R(ight), EU-W(rong), H(ome)-R, H(ome)-W. This partition is important 
because the attitude towards more EU integration has to be framed in 
comparison with the alternative represented by the home country. We present 
the data in different formats. Table A2 shows the data by country: each 
column gives the responses to each of the four choices in percent points.7 Table A3 presents the descending ranking of countries according to responses 
for each choice. The tables also include the average values for the EZ 
countries, the No-EZ countries and the EU as a whole. 
 
As can be seen, the top EU-R countries are Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, 
Croatia, Denmark, Poland, and Lithuania. Except Denmark, these are all new 
accession countries, with a possible "honeymoon" effect with the EU, and 
none of them belonged to the EZ in 2014. Indeed, the EZ ranks much lower 
than the No-EZ. By contrast, the top EU-W countries are all EZ countries 
(Greece, France, Cyprus, Italy, Austria, Spain, Finland, and Belgium) so that 
on this dimension the EZ ranks much higher than the No-EZ. It therefore 
seems that the EZ is a liability for the feelings towards Europe. The attitude 
towards the home country is more mixed geographically, but the EZ as a 
whole ranks lower than the No-EZ for positive judgements, and higher for 
negative ones. These data are open to two different interpretations. One 
regards the majority of the EZ public opinion as subscribing to the                                                         7 The complement to 100 corresponds to figures related to the other possible answers: "neither 
the one nor the other" and "don’t know".  
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Commission's message that each country is mostly responsible for its own 
problems and solutions. The other points out that the EZ governments' 
sovereignty is a fiction, since they are actually unable to deliver what they 
promise within the EZ straitjacket.  Overall, these data suggest that the EZ is 
an area of bitter discontent both with the EU and with own home countries. 
 
Figure 4. Country distribution of respondents along the four choices in Table A2 
 Source: Elaborations on Table A2. Circled countries have a positive economic MTI (see 
Table A5 and section 4).  
In Figure 4 we provide, in a single snapshot, the country distribution of 
respondents along the four dimensions of the questionnaire: that is, European 
Union/Home (EU/H), Right/Wrong (R/W). We have rearranged the data as 
follows. First we have selected the EU/H dimensions. For each of the two we 
have computed the difference between respondents choosing R and W; hence a 
positive (negative) figure indicates the prevalence of R over W (of W over R) 
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and its intensity. Then each country has been inserted into a scatterplot 
divided into four quadrants.  
 
The EU-R/H-R quadrant displays countries where the majority of respondents 
appear supportive of the current state of affairs both the EU and the national 
level. The popular belief that these are mainly people in the "German block" is 
supported by the data. At the opposite pole we find the EU-W/H-W quadrant: 
that is, countries with people largely angry with both the EU and their home 
country. Again, these are mostly EZ countries. The EU-R/H-W quadrant 
mainly hosts new accession "honeymoon" countries: here the majority of 
people may view Europe (as-it-is) as a positive driver of change of the 
national evils.8 Finally, the last quadrant EU-W/H-R, with prevalent pro-
national feelings, seems less quantitatively significant, though it contains, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, the UK, the most influential country outside the EZ.  
 
To gauge the quantitative dimension of the four quadrants, in Table A4 we 
present the size of the population of each of them relative to the active 
population (age 15-64) of the EU and, for the relevant countries, of the EZ. As 
can be seen, the EU-W/H-W quadrant of (prevalent) global dissatisfaction 
accounts for 42% of the EU population and for a remarkable 61% of the EZ 
population, almost twice the population of (prevalent) global satisfaction. 
Europe is largely an angry continent. 
 
4.2 Adding the economic dimension  
 
It is reasonable to think that one main driver of the responses examined above 
along the four options of the questionnaire is the perception of the crisis at the                                                         8 It is worth noting that, as also reported by Guiso et al. (2014), this was the majority attitude in several countries (like Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) before they joined the EZ, and that have now moved to the EU-W/H-W "angry club". 
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national level. This hypothesis is relevant for two reasons. The first is that 
differences in the intensity of the crisis and its perception within the EU may 
account for differences in judgments and attitudes towards the EU. The 
second is that if there is a sustained and generalized recovery in the near future, 
the picture provided by the Eurobarometer data may change.  
 
Abundant research is available with tests of the hypothesis that economic 
variables can explain the Eurobarometer opinion polls data. Among recent 
relevant examples, Guiso et al. (2014) perform a panel regression analysis of 
the drop in the EU consensus mentioned above on a set of economic variables 
during the crisis at a fairly disaggregate level. They find that unemployment 
is a major explanatory variable, but also, as expected, that differences across 
countries matter. The negative shift in judgments has been more marked in 
the Southern countries, where people also seem to have attached greater 
weight to the perceived unfairness of EU-level policies as a cause of their 
worse economic conditions. This finding is consistent with Hobolt and Wratil 
(2015), who claim that the crisis has also changed the main driver of the 
attitude towards (or against) the EU from national identity to the so-called 
"utilitarian view" based on the personal assessment of costs and benefits of 
EU integration and policies. If this is the case, Hobolt and Wratil suggest that 
national identity may become less of an obstacle for further integration 
provided that better economic results are delivered. Somewhat at odds with 
the general tendencies that we presented at the beginning of this section are 
the results obtained by Kuhn and Stöckel (2014), according to which the crisis 
has more strongly shocked the support for EU integration in general than for 
EU economic governance in particular.9 Moreover, they argue that support for 
EU economic governance has been more robust in economically weaker                                                         9 As far as we can understand, the authors do not clarify whether "support" means that the EU 
ought to be the right policy maker in the face of the crisis or whether it means that the EU policy has been the right one. 
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countries and classes afraid of losing welfare state protections. On this view, 
resistance to further integration may come from stronger countries and 
classes.  
 
These studies share three main insights. The first is that the attitude towards 
stronger integration is the result of multifaceted factors. The second is that 
national differences matter in the composition and relative weights of factors. 
The third is that these factors have been changed by the crisis. Against this 
background we introduce the economic dimension into our analysis not as a 
determinant but as a further characterization of the distribution of majority 
national opinions in our four quadrants.  
 
To this end, we have elaborated a simple index of "economic pain" for each 
country. The purpose of the index is to yield a summary measure of the 
intensity of the crisis. Among the economic variables that may be considered, 
we have chosen four: growth rate, per capita real disposable income, 
unemployment rate, and "austerity" as given by a restriction of the public 
primary budget relative to GDP.10 Whilst all these variables are consistent 
with academic definitions of crises, what is more relevant to our purposes is 
that they have an impact on personal lives, and that the relevant information 
is commonly accessible to ordinary people via the media. Note that our choice 
has been driven not only by economic principles, but also by the subjective 
"perception" of the economy and of an economic crisis by ordinary people 
(Nilsson and Svensson 1986, Baron 1994, Nicotra et al. 2001).11   
 
                                                        10 Unless otherwise stated, the single source of data is the AMECO database of Eurostat. 11 For instance, the growth rate and the level of per capita income have almost the same economic content, but they are different at the perception level. The former is not perceived directly at the personal level but affects the "image" of the country (or of the government) as doing well or badly. The latter is instead closer to the personal perception of well being. 
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In order to capture the perception of the crisis better, we have considered two 
results in this literature. The first is that an economic crisis is not just a single 
"bad year": perception is strongly reinforced by duration. The second is that 
perception is also the result of comparison between a contingent situation and 
a benchmark, e.g. memory of what is "normal" or of the previous situation. 
Therefore, we have chosen a well-defined time frame. First, we have 
identified 2009, when all countries fell into recession, as the beginning of the 
crisis. We have then set the five-year post-crisis period as spanning from 2009 to 
2013, the last full year of official data before the Eurobarometer opinion poll.12 
Symmetrically, we have also set the five-year pre-crisis period as spanning from 
2004 to 2008.13 Each variable except austerity enters the index as the difference 
between its average value in 2009-13 and in 2004-08. Austerity instead 
consists of the extent of post-crisis fiscal restrictions measured by the year 
average change in the primary budget/GDP ratio from 2010 to 2013. In the 
absence of strong a priori information on the relative importance of each 
variable, we have decided to weigh them equally; hence the index is the 
simple average of the four variables. This is called the "medium-term index" 
(MTI): a negative figure indicates the extent of the crisis as a medium-run overall 
deterioration of the perceived economic situation with respect to the pre-crisis period. 
 
According to the so-called "peak-end effect" (Fredrickson and Kahneman 
1993, Kahneman 2000), the perception of a painful experience is conditioned 
by the final state of the subject in comparison with the peak of pain rather 
than with the overall duration of the pain. Translated into our context, we 
may say that if a substantial improvement in the economic situation takes place, 
it may have a countervailing effect on the perception of the previous situation.                                                         12 As a consequence, we have excluded Croatia, which joined the EU in 2014, and we have excluded Latvia from the EZ, which it joined in 2015. 13 Some countries experienced an early recession in 2008, but this was mostly concentrated in the third or fourth quarter, and was of limited magnitude. 
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Hence, we have also computed a "short-term index" (STI) yielded by the 
change in the relevant variables from 2013 to 2014, the year of the 
Eurobarometer opinion poll. Table A5 displays the countries in descending 
order of economic pain according to both indexes. 
 
The first information to be considered is that almost 78% (21/27) of the EU 
countries display a negative MTI, i.e. from 2009 to 2013 their citizens may 
have perceived a deterioration of their national (if not necessarily personal) 
economic situation with respect to the pre-crisis period. Yet, the extent of 
deterioration is quite different across countries. Greece's economic pain has 
been eight times worse than Belgium’s and more than three times worse than 
the EZ average. On the other hand, almost all countries (except Slovenia, 
Cyprus, Greece and Denmark) experienced an improvement from 2013 to 
2014. Note, however, that some of the countries with the worst MTI also have 
poor or negative STI (and vice versa): a finding reminiscent of the so-called 
"hysteresis effect" in macroeconomics. This effect may also operate at the 
perception level, so that a weak recent improvement may be insufficient to 
overcome the legacy of a negative economic experience. 
 
The second information of interest concerns the intersection of economic pain 
with our subsets of the EU: EZ, No-EZ and the four quadrants of Figure 4. We 
see in Table A5 that, on average, the EZ has suffered almost twice the 
economic pain, and enjoyed less than half the recovery, with respect to the 
No-EZ. We also see that the EU-W/H-W quadrant of global discontent on 
average ranks very high on both indexes, i.e. severe economic pain in the past 
five years and feeble relief in the present. Its polar quadrant EU-R/H-R fares 
better, and the "honeymoon" quadrant EU-R/H-W even more so.  
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The mapping at the country level is also of some interest. See again Figure 4 
for reference. With regard to the EU, the 21 countries with negative MTI are 
almost equally split between the majority of judgements for EU-W (10) and 
for EU-R (11). With regard to the home country, H-W prevails in 12 countries, 
whilst H-R does so in 9. As to the four quadrants, 8 of the 9 countries in the 
EU-W/H-W quadrant also display a negative MTI (the exception is Slovakia). 
However, note that these 8 countries are just a fraction of the 21 with negative 
MTI. In fact, also 6 of the 8 countries in the EU-R/H-R quadrant, and 5 of the 7 
countries in EU-R/H-W, have a negative MTI, and quite a negative one in 
some cases (Ireland, Luxembourg, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). 
 
The association of the economic dimension with our fourfold distribution of 
countries shows no systematic pattern and yields a quite nuanced picture. It 
seems however broadly consistent with, and adds further qualifications to, 
the common findings in the related studies mentioned above:  
 1) the economic pain generated by the crisis has been more severe in 
the EZ, in particular in the countries in the area of global discontent, and 
 2) the recent economic recovery of this group of countries has brought 
weaker relief than elsewhere; however, 
 3) economic pain is not systematically associated with global 
discontent: several countries affected by non-negligible economic pain show 
prevalent positive judgements towards the actions undertaken by their own 
country and/or by the EU. 
 
Overall, in the light of our analysis we may also say that Figure 4 identifies a 
geo-economic cleavage of Europe carved by the crisis which is more nuanced 
and complex than the conventional one between "Core and Periphery" or 
"North and South", which at most, and quite roughly, captures the EZ 
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polarization between our quadrants of overall satisfaction (EU-R/H-R) and 
overall dissatisfaction (EU-W/H-W). 
 
4.3 Political implications 
 
This state of the public opinion makes the resolution of Europe's stalemate 
unlikely. In fact,  
 1) The EU-R/H-R countries’ global satisfaction may well be supportive 
of the status quo. This hypothesis is corroborated by the argument put forward 
by Kuhn and Stöckel (2014) that support for further integration is weaker in 
(relatively) healthier countries. 
 2) People in the EU-W/H-W countries with global dissatisfaction may 
be ready to support major changes, but it is not clear which changes, how and 
where. For instance, Gros's (2014) interpretation of the electoral results as in 
the end supportive of pro-Europe parties and policies is questionable. The most 
significant success (if not the only one) of a pro-Europe party, the Italian 
Democratic Party, is explainable with a wish to change the country; but, in 
light of Italy’s location on the map, not so much by the wish to change it as 
today's Europe dictates.14 Likewise, we find unpersuasive Kuhn and Stöckel’s 
(2014) claim that the economically weaker countries and classes, largely 
present in this area, may welcome more integration as a shield for their 
interests. During the crisis, EU integration has mostly meant more "austerity" 
to them: that is, a serious threat to welfare state protections.  
 3) An interpretation à la Gros seems more appropriate for the EU-R/H-
W countries, where Europe (as-it-is) may indeed be seen as a positive driver 
of the country’s change.  
                                                        14 Indeed, the winning slogan coined by the Democratic leader Matteo Renzi was "change Italy to change Europe". 
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 4) The shift from an identitarian to a utilitarian approach to EU 
integration highlighted by Hobolt and Wratil (2015) may remove the hurdle 
of national identity but may well spur demand for stronger protection from 
national governments to the extent that the EU policies are perceived as 
harmful, as has been the case with the EU-W/H-W countries. 
 
 
5. From sentiments to votes 
 
Sentiments and opinions matter politically as they are translated into votes 
and, above all, seats in the Parliament. Hence we have also mapped the 
electoral results of Table A1 onto our subsets of the EU, as can be seen in 
Figure 5. The overlap between our reading of opinions put forward in section 
4 and the actual votes is remarkable and quite informative.  
 
To begin with, let us consider the EZ vis-à-vis the No-EZ. In our previous 
analysis, the EZ was an area of harder economic pain and discontent than the 
EU as a whole. Actually, it assigned an almost balanced share of seats to the 
CR/R (43.8%) and to the CL/L parties (42.9%), whereas the former obtained 
the absolute majority of seats in the No-EZ countries (54.3%). Were there an 
EZ Parliament, it would differ from the existing one with greater weight of 
supporters of changes in European policies. Think of the Commission: while 
its composition barely reflects the electoral results of the EU as whole, the 
powers that it exerts in fiscal and monetary affairs are different for EZ and 
No-EZ citizens. If this fact is not acknowledged, the EZ citizens might start 
complaining that their political will has been distorted by people living outside 
the EZ, which is indeed a different institutional entity in some key 
prerogatives of sovereignty. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of Parliamentary seats in the four quadrants of Figure 4 
 
 
The picture is even more complex if look at the four quadrants in Figure 4. We 
have argued that the majority of people in the EU-R/H-R quadrant may be in 
favour of the status quo at the EU level. Indeed, the CR/R parties obtained 
almost 50% of the seats in this area. CL/L stopped at 45.7%, whereas - 
unsurprisingly - NE had the worst performance. Approval for Europe (as-it-
is) seems also consistently expressed by countries in the EU-R/H-W quadrant, 
which is where the CR/R aggregation achieved the largest success (67.1%) at 
the expense of all the others. By contrast, the EU-W/H-W quadrant expressing 
CR/R; 43.1 
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global anger awarded the majority of seats to the CL/L parties (42.9%), but 
also a conspicuous 17.5% to NE and Others (NI). In the EU-W/H-R area, the 
two major aggregations obtained the same share of votes but well below than 
elsewhere (36.6%), and the NE obtained their largest number of seats (though 
this was almost entirely due to the success of the UKIP in the UK). 
 
These figures state that the CR/R parties won the EU Parliament in the EU-
R/H-W and the EU-R/H-R quadrants, that is, Germany and its historical 
North-Eastern satellites across the EZ as well as the no-EZ. But can these pro-
Europe(as-it-is) votes be summed up? Do they come from, and do they 
approve, the same Europe? In future perspective, are countries in these two 
areas better EZ partners than the present ones?  Maybe, or maybe not if in the 
long run the costs of being in the EU with the euro exceed the benefits from 
being in the EU without the euro (as some EZ citizens have perhaps come to 
believe). 
 
Therefore, the geo-economic cleavage across Europe that we have found in 
the data also has a political dimension. We deem the resulting geo-economic-
political map worrisome. It reveals the germs of Europe’s dis-integration at 
the level of national public opinions and electoral choices, which jeopardizes the 
chances of "progress through crises" in force of pressure "from below".15 Some 
observers foresee that in the EU political space the traditional Left-Right 
spectrum will be replaced by the "insiders (establishment) vs. outsiders (anti-
establishment)" or "pro-Europe vs. anti-Europe" divide (Bertsou 2014). We 
suggest a third possibility: a tendency to ‘nationalize’ the conflicting policy 
options concerning causes and remedies of the crisis, and the reform of the                                                         15 As it is well known, financial markets anticipated the dis-integration process (see e.g. Croci Angelini et al. 2015). After the launch of the euro, rapid financial integration boosted cross-border lending and portfolio diversification with negligible perception of country-specific factors. In 2009, cross-border lending suddenly stopped, and strong re-nationalization of financial portfolios occurred, mostly at the expense of the weaker countries. 
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EU institutions. What we mean is that e.g. the Italians who vote Left or Right 
do not want the same Europe as e.g. the Germans who vote Left or Right, 
whereas on European matters the distance between Left and Right within 
Italy and within Germany is less than between the Italian and the German Left, 
and between the Italian and the German Right (Berlusconi, Sarkozy and 
Merkel all belong to the same party in Strasbourg!). In Strasbourg the 
different political colours of Left and Right fade away, and the colours of the 
national flag become predominant. 16 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
It is now increasingly agreed, up to the top EU institutions, that an important 
driver of the European economic crisis has been the faulty design of the 
Monetary Union. First and foremost its shaky foundations on the national 
responsibility doctrine are epitomized by the asymmetry between a 
supranational monetary authority and independent, un-coordinated fiscal 
sovereigns. The idea of overcoming this "original sin" through implicit 
coordination of fiscal policies enforced by fixed rules has not withstood the 
first hard stress test of the Great Recession. Indeed, the "country-by-country" 
approach ensuing from the national responsibility doctrine has led to serious 
mismanagement of the crisis. Accordingly, there is an urgent need for 
substantial steps towards further political integration, starting from the 
creation of truly European fiscal institutions vis-à-vis the ECB.  
 
                                                        16 While we were completing this paper, the immigration crisis broke out. In all evidence, it is going to magnify this tendency to nationalize the European issues with devastating effects on the social, political and institutional fabric of the EU.  
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The stumbling block along this way has traditionally been seen as the lack of 
political will. We see the EU as caught in a stalemate that we have 
represented as a trilemma faced by the major European political forces among 
the goals of European integration, National sovereignty and Democratic 
control. The trilemma may be even more paralyzing for the EZ, given its 
larger investment in integration already in place. We have argued that the 
2014 EU Parliament general elections have left the stalemate unresolved.  
 
To substantiate this argument, we have approached the political will problem 
"from below". By comparing Eurobarometer opinion polls, an indicator of 
economic pain, and actual electoral votes at the country level, we have shown 
the surge of what we call Europe's Great Divide along a geo-economic-
political cleavage. We have identified four groups of countries according to 
people's judgments about the EU and the home country in the present 
contingencies. The EZ is split between a group of global discontent with both 
the EU and the home country, and a group of global satisfaction with them. 
The largest part of the other EU countries, mostly new accession and 
emergent ones, fall in a third group with positive judgements towards the EU 
and negative ones towards their home country. The fourth group comprises a 
few countries with positive attitudes towards the home country and negative 
ones towards the EU.  The disaggregation of electoral results into these four 
groups shows that the Centre-Right parties won the EU Parliament by gaining 
the absolute majority of seats in the second and third group of countries, and 
therefore consistently receiving support for the status quo. By contrast, Centre-
Left parties prevailed in the first group of global discontent by promising a 
change of European institutions and their policies. If the EZ had its own 
parliament, it would be split equally between Centre-Left and Centre-Right. 
This landscape is more complex, and perhaps worse, than the simplistic one 
divided between "North" and "South" or "Core" and "Periphery". 
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Our analysis concludes that a vicious circle has been triggered between the 
economic crisis and its political repercussions. Far from prompting further 
integration, the crisis pushes in the opposite direction. The tendency has 
arisen to "nationalize" different policy options concerning the crisis’s 
management and the reform of the European institutions. By this we mean 
that the policy options are no longer trans-national along the traditional 
Left/Right dimension; nor are they expressed by way of trans-national 
political groups as they appear on paper. The main political groups instead 
become the passive – if not complacent  vehicles to engage in an inter-
national life or death struggle over the "national self" in the European arena. 
The political stalemate facing the choice between "more" or "less Europe" is 
now rooted in the citizens’ will, so that it can hardly be resolved by pressure 
"from below" in a predictable future. 
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Appendix    
Table A1. Seats in the European Parliament, 2014 Centre-Right/Right  EPP, ALDE, ECR 358 47.7% Centre-Left/Left S&D, GREENS/EFA, GUE/NGL 293 39.0% NE EFD 48 6.4% Others  52 6.9% Total  751 100.0% EEP = European People's Party, ALDE = Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, ECR = European Conservatives and Reformists, S&D = Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, GREENS/EFA = The Greens-European Free Alliance, GUE/NGL = Gauche Unitaire Européenne / Nordic Green Left, EFD = Europe of Freedom and Democracy (UKIP, 5STARS)  
  
Table A2. “At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in 
the right direction or in the wrong direction, in the European Union / in your 
home country?” (% respondents per country)  EU-R EU-W Home-R Home-W AT 25 42 35 29 BE 40 41 41 39 BG 49 13 18 54 CY 19 49 22 56 CZ 35 40 30 49 DE 33 31 46 24 DK 46 36 54 36 EE 49 18 45 28 EL 15 64 9 79 ES 26 42 18 66 FI 33 42 38 41 FR 21 56 15 72 HR 47 25 15 68 HU 39 23 27 43 IE 38 25 45 28 IT 15 45 13 58 LT 45 16 22 48 LU 39 31 53 22 LV 35 20 22 40 MT 43 12 54 13 NL 45 31 52 33 PL 46 27 29 53 PT 25 34 21 52 RO 48 20 18 62 SE 41 39 46 41 SL 32 23 9 64 SK 35 39 20 57 UK 20 34 39 31 EU-28 30 37 29 48 EZ-18 26 42 27 50 No-EZ 36 29 32 44 Source: Special Eurobarometer n. 415, July 2014.  
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Table A3. “At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in 
the right direction or in the wrong direction, in the European Union / in your 
home country?”. Descending ranking of respondents per country Top EU-R Top EU-W Top Home-R Top Home-W BG 49 EL 64 DK 54 EL 79 EE 49 FR 56 MT 54 FR 72 RO 48 CY 49 LU 53 HR 68 HR 47 IT 45 NL 52 ES 66 DK 46 AT 42 DE 46 SL 64 PL 46 ES 42 SE 46 RO 62 LT 45 FI 42 EE 45 IT 58 NL 45 EZ-18 42 IE 45 SK 57 MT 43 BE 41 BE 41 CY 56 SE 41 CZ 40 UK 39 BG 54 BE 40 SE 39 FI 38 PL 53 HU 39 SK 39 AT 35 PT 52 LU 39 EU-28 37 No-EZ 32 EZ-18 50 IE 38 DK 36 CZ 30 CZ 49 
No-EZ 36 PT 34 PL 29 LT 48 CZ 35 UK 34 EU-28 29 EU-28 48 LV 35 DE 31 HU 27 No-EZ 44 SK 35 LU 31 EZ-18 27 HU 43 DE 33 NL 31 CY 22 FI 41 FI 33 No-EZ 29 LT 22 SE 41 SL 32 PL 27 LV 22 LV 40 
EU-28 30 HR 25 PT 21 BE 39 ES 26 IE 25 SK 20 DK 36 
EZ-18 26 HU 23 BG 18 NL 33 AT 25 SL 23 ES 18 UK 31 PT 25 LV 20 RO 18 AT 29 FR 21 RO 20 FR 15 EE 28 UK 20 EE 18 HR 15 IE 28 CY 19 LT 16 IT 13 DE 24 EL 15 BG 13 EL 9 LU 22 IT 15 MT 12 SL 9 MT 13 Source: Table A2.    
Table A4. Size of the population of the four quadrants of Figure 4 relative to the 
active population (age 15-64)a of the EU and, for the relevant countries, of the EZ.   EU-R/H-W EU-R/H-R EU-W/H-R EU-W/H-W % of EU population 17.9 23.8 16.4 41.9 % of EZ population 1.2 32.0 5.9 60.8 aEurostat database AMECO 
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Table A5. Country descending order of economic pain MTI STI GRE -8.1 SLO -1.0 IRE -7.4 GRE -1.0 SPA -5.8 CYP -0.6 LAT -4.4 DEN -0.3 CYP -4.4 FRA 0.1 EST -3.9 LUX 0.1 LUX -3.7 ITA 0.1 ITA -3.3 FIN 0.1 
EU-W/H-W -3.2 AUS 0.2 POR -2.9 EST 0.4 LIT -2.8 EZ-17 0.5 SLO -2.7 EU-W/H-W 0.5 UK -2.7 NET 0.5 DEN -2.6 EU-W/H-R 0.6 
EZ-17 -2.6 BEL 0.6 FIN -2.3 SWE 0.6 
EU-R/H-R -2.2 EU-R/H-R 0.7 CZE -2.2 GER 0.7 HUN -2.1 ROM 0.7 
No-EZ -1.4 LAT 0.9 
EU-W/H-R -1.2 UK 1.0 FRA -1.2 SPA 1.1 SWE -1.0 No-EZ 1.2 NET -1.0 BUL 1.4 BEL -1.0 MAL 1.4 
EU-R/H-W -0.8 SLK 1.5 ROM -0.3 EU-R/H-W 1.5 AUS 0.0 POR 1.5 BUL 0.5 CZE 1.6 MAL 0.8 LIT 1.7 SLK 1.1 POL 1.8 GER 1.4 IRE 2.2 POL 4.0 HUN 2.3 Source: Elaborations on Eurostat AMECO database.  
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